Cooperation can emerge in prisoner's dilemma from a multi-species predator prey replicator dynamic

DOI10.1016/J.MBS.2016.05.006zbMath1415.91046OpenAlexW2436494108WikidataQ46530612 ScholiaQ46530612MaRDI QIDQ310000

Christopher Griffin, Elisabeth Paulson

Publication date: 7 September 2016

Published in: Mathematical Biosciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mbs.2016.05.006

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitycooperationevolutionary gameprisoners' dilemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (3)

Generalized Hamiltonian dynamics and chaos in evolutionary games on networks ⋮ A finite population destroys a traveling wave in spatial replicator dynamics ⋮ Analysis of quasi-dynamic ordinary differential equations and the quasi-dynamic replicator

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• Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent

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