Monetary policy games, financial instability and incomplete information

DOI10.1007/S10436-016-0276-6MaRDI QIDQ315466zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Charles Richard Barrett, Ioanna Kokores, Somnath Sen

Publication date 21 September 2016

Published in Annals of Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10436-016-0276-6

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationmonetary policycentral bankfinancial stabilitystrategic behavior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Applications of game theory (91A80) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• Financial stability under model uncertainty
• Monetary policy as financial stability regulation
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• Optimal monetary policy under incomplete markets and aggregate uncertainty: a long-run perspective
• On the non-neutrality and optimality of monetary policy when financial markets are incomplete: a macroeconomic perspective

Cites work

• A model to analyse financial fragility
• Credibility of Policies Versus Credibility of Policymakers
• Monetary policy games, financial instability and incomplete information
• On the necessity of five risk measures
• Policy-making in EMU: strategies, rules and discretion

Cited in

(3)

• Monetary policy games, financial instability and incomplete information
• Volatile policy and private information: The case of monetary shocks
• Monetary policy as financial stability regulation

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