Titelbaum's theory of de se updating and two versions of Sleeping Beauty

DOI10.1007/S10670-015-9721-6MaRDI QIDQ320185zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Namjoong Kim

Publication date 6 October 2016

Published in Erkenntnis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-015-9721-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Probability and inductive logic (03B48) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Axioms; other general questions in probability (60A05)

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Cites work

• Sleeping Beauty and shifted Jeffrey conditionalization
• What conditional probability could not be

Cited in

(3)

• De se belief and rational choice
• Reply to Kim's ``Two versions of Sleeping Beauty
• Even for objectivists, sleeping beauty isn’t so simple

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