Evidence, significance, and counterfactuals: Schramm on the new riddle of induction

DOI10.1007/S10670-015-9733-2MaRDI QIDQ320319zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Chris Dorst

Publication date 6 October 2016

Published in Erkenntnis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-015-9733-2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Probability and inductive logic (03B48) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Recommendations

• Evidence, hypothesis, and grue
• Goodman's ``new riddle
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• Hempel's Raven Paradox: A Lacuna in the Standard Bayesian Solution
• Testability and Ockham's razor: How formal and statistical learning theory converge in the new riddle of induction

Cites work

• Counterfactuals.
• Evidence, hypothesis, and grue
• I.—STUDIES IN THE LOGIC OF CONFIRMATION (I.)

Cited in

(4)

• Evidence, hypothesis, and grue
• Goodman's ``new riddle
• Two conceptions of weight of evidence in Peirce's \textit{Illustrations of the logic of science}
• Hempel, Grue and the logical empiricist baseline

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