Evidence, significance, and counterfactuals: Schramm on the new riddle of induction

DOI10.1007/S10670-015-9733-2zbMATH Open1346.03016OpenAlexW2087788442MaRDI QIDQ320319FDOQ320319

Authors: Chris Dorst 

Publication date: 6 October 2016

Published in: Erkenntnis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-015-9733-2

Recommendations

• Evidence, hypothesis, and grue
• Goodman's ``new riddle
• On not changing the problem: a reply to Howson
• Hempel's Raven Paradox: A Lacuna in the Standard Bayesian Solution
• Testability and Ockham's razor: How formal and statistical learning theory converge in the new riddle of induction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Probability and inductive logic (03B48) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Cites Work

• Counterfactuals.
• Evidence, hypothesis, and grue
• I.—STUDIES IN THE LOGIC OF CONFIRMATION (I.)

Cited In (4)

• Evidence, hypothesis, and grue
• Goodman's ``new riddle
• Two conceptions of weight of evidence in Peirce's \textit{Illustrations of the logic of science}
• Hempel, Grue and the logical empiricist baseline

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