Finite cooperative games: parametrisation of the concept of equilibrium (from Pareto to Nash) and stability of the efficient situation in the Hölder metric

DOI10.1515/DMA.2009.013zbMATH Open1233.91015OpenAlexW2057317244MaRDI QIDQ3225869FDOQ3225869

Authors: Olga V. Karelkina, V. A. Emelichev 

Publication date: 23 March 2012

Published in: Discrete Mathematics and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/dma.2009.013

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• On stability of an efficient solution of a vector Boolean problem of maximisation of absolute values of linear functions
• Stability of discrete vector problems with the parametric principle of optimality
• Stability radius of an efficient solution of a vector problem of integer linear programming in the Hölder metric

Cited In (11)

• Stability of generally efficient situation in finite cooperative games with parametric optimality principle (from Pareto to Nash)
• On stability of an optimal situation in a finite cooperative game with a parametric concept of equilibrium (from lexicographic optimality to Nash equilibrium)
• Finite cooperative games with a parametric concept of equilibrium under uncertainty conditions
• On the stability of a finite cooperative game with the parametric concept of equilibrium (``from Pareto to Nash)
• Postoptimal analysis of a finite cooperative game
• On stability of Nash equilibrium situations and Pareto optimal situations in finite games
• On stability for a finite cooperative game with a generalized concept of equilibrium
• Finite cooperative games: parametrization of the optimality priciple (\`\` from Pareto to Nash) and the stability of generally efficient situations
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Measure of stability for a finite cooperative game with a parametric optimality principle (from Pareto to Nash)
• Finite games with perturbed payoffs

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