"Inductive Behavior" as a Basic Concept of Philosophy of Science

DOI10.2307/1401671zbMATH Open0087.24404OpenAlexW2799443965MaRDI QIDQ3259690FDOQ3259690

Authors: Jerzy Splawa-Neyman 

Publication date: 1957

Published in: Revue de l'Institut International de Statistique / Review of the International Statistical Institute (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1401671

zbMATH Keywords

philosophy and foundations of mathematics

Cited In (12)

• Logicist statistics. I: Models and modeling
• The consistency test does not -- and cannot -- deliver what is advertised: a comment on Francis (2013)
• A discussion of the question: for what use are tests of hypotheses and tests of significance
• The Neyman-Pearson theory as decision theory, and as inference theory; with a criticism of the Lindley-Savage argument for Bayesian theory
• What can the foundations discussion contribute to data analysis? And what may be some of the future directions in robust methods and data analysis?
• Bayesian and frequentist testing for differences between two groups with parametric and nonparametric two-sample tests
• A battle in the statistics wars: a simulation-based comparison of Bayesian, frequentist and Williamsonian methodologies
• Eliciting second-order beliefs
• Critical issues in different inferential paradigms
• Interval estimation, point estimation, and null hypothesis significance testing calibrated by an estimated posterior probability of the null hypothesis
• Inductivism and probabilism
• Adversarial and Amiable Inference in Medical Diagnosis, Reliability and Survival Analysis

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