Seeing is believing: formalising false-belief tasks in dynamic epistemic logic

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-62864-6_8MaRDI QIDQ3299577zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Thomas Bolander

Publication date 24 July 2020

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62864-6_8

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic epistemic logic (DEL)false belief taskobservational propositionsSally-Anne taskstandard model events

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Logic in artificial intelligence (68T27)

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Cites work

• A poor man's epistemic logic based on propositional assignment and higher-order observation
• Announcements to attentive agents
• Arrow update logic
• Children's application of theory of mind in reasoning and language
• Conditional epistemic planning
• Epistemic planning for single- and multi-agent systems
• Listen to me! Public announcements to agents that pay attention -- or not
• Logic and social cognition. The facts matter, and so do computational models
• Logics for epistemic programs
• Logics of communication and change
• My beliefs about your beliefs: a case study in theory of mind and epistemic logic
• Playing cards with Hintikka: an introduction to dynamic epistemic logic
• Private announcement and belief expansion: an internal perspective
• Reasoning about the beliefs of agents in multi-agent domains in the presence of state constraints: the action language mAL
• Semantic results for ontic and epistemic change
• Strategic reasoning: building cognitive models from logical formulas
• The logic of public announcements, common knowledge, and private suspicions

Cited in

(10)

• An action language for multi-agent domains
• Epistemic planning with attention as a bounded resource
• A lightweight epistemic logic and its application to planning
• Hybrid-logical reasoning in the Smarties and Sally-Anne tasks
• Towards a logical formalisation of Theory of Mind: a study on false belief tasks
• Second-order false-belief tasks: analysis and formalization
• Incorrect responses in first-order false-belief tests: a hybrid-logical formalization
• Parameterized complexity results for a model of theory of mind based on dynamic epistemic logic
• A logical formalisation of false belief tasks
• A logic for bounded multi-agent reasoning: deductive inference, introspection, and attribution

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