scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3891037

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Publication:3347568





[For the entire collection see Zbl 0552.00017.] Wage bargaining may formally be treated as decision problems among two parties with different utility functions. The decision consists of determining the increase of the wage rate for the time of the tariff- contract commonly accepted by the both tariff-parties representing the employers and the employees respectively. So far in principle the same solution methods of the game and the bargaining theory can be applied to such decision situations as they come into question for multi-person- decision problems in organizations. However because of the special problem structure in the case of wage bargaining one is restricted mainly to cooperative solution concepts without side payments. In the following it will especially be analysed, how far the methodical approaches of Nash (1953), Zeuthen (1930) and Contini and Zionts (1968) can be used in practice in order to explain and reconstruct the courses of and the agreements within wage bargaining processes. Thereby the investigations refer to wage bargaining in the metal industry of the Federal Republic of Germany between 1961 and 1979.











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