On the Effectiveness of Liability Rules when Agents are not Identical

DOI10.2307/2297973MaRDI QIDQ3348673zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Winand Emons, Joel Sobel

Publication date 1991

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://doc.rero.ch/record/292687/files/58-2-375.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

bilateral accidents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Mathematical economics (91B99) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Recommendations

• Efficient liability rules: Complete characterization.
• On the choice of liability rules
• Efficient simple liability assignment rules: a complete characterization
• Optimal liability rules under mutual externalities among multiagents
• Relative performance of liability rules: experimental evidence

Cited in

(10)

• Efficient liability rules: Complete characterization.
• Liability sharing and the role of insurance for environmental accidents
• Efficient simple liability assignment rules: a complete characterization
• Limited liability and non-responsiveness in agency models
• Liability situations with successive tortfeasors
• Optimal liability rules under mutual externalities among multiagents
• Relative performance of liability rules: experimental evidence
• Liability Rules and Hazardous Materials Transportation
• On the choice of liability rules
• A note on selection effects of the Hand rule

This page was built for publication: On the Effectiveness of Liability Rules when Agents are not Identical

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3348673)