Efficient liability rules: Complete characterization.

DOI10.1007/S007120200008MaRDI QIDQ698203zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors M. C. Fu

Publication date 2002

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s007120200008

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumefficient rulesliability rulesnegligence liabilitytotal social costs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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• Optimal liability rules under mutual externalities among multiagents
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• Negligence rules coping with hidden precaution
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