Optimal liability rules under mutual externalities among multiagents

DOI10.1080/02522667.2002.10699516MaRDI QIDQ4546029zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Teruhisa Nakai

Publication date 18 August 2002

Published in Journal of Information and Optimization Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1080/02522667.2002.10699516

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

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• Axiomatic analysis of liability problems with rooted-tree networks in tort law
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• On the Effectiveness of Liability Rules when Agents are not Identical
• From Pigou to extended liability: on the optimal taxation of externalities under imperfect financial markets

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