The evolution of fairness in the coevolutionary ultimatum games
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3904630 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
- Anonymity versus punishment in ultimatum bargaining
- Empathy leads to fairness
- Learning to reach agreement in a continuous ultimatum game
- Statistical fluctuations in population bargaining in the ultimatum game: static and evolutionary aspects
- The spatial ultimatum game revisited
Cited in
(10)- The effect of similarity on the evolution of fairness in the ultimatum game
- Effects of game willingness on the evolution of fairness in the ultimatum game
- Coevolution of spatial ultimatum game and link weight promotes fairness
- How moral codes evolve in a trust game
- The evolutionary analysis of the ultimatum game based on the net-profit decision
- Evolutionary dynamics of fairness on graphs with migration
- Economic harmony: an epistemic theory of economic interactions
- Evolution of fairness in the dictator game by multilevel selection
- Fairness evolution in the ultimatum game is a function of reward size
- Pinning control of social fairness in the ultimatum game
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