Rationality of final decisions leads to sequential equilibrium

zbMATH Open1129.91308MaRDI QIDQ3374465FDOQ3374465

R. Ishikawa, T. Matsuhisa

Publication date: 9 March 2006

zbMATH Keywords

knowledgebackward inductionepistemic conditions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18)

Cited In (3)

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• Endogenous sequencing of firm decisions

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