On the evolution of partial respect for ownership

DOI10.1007/S13235-015-0152-4zbMath1348.91040OpenAlexW2046970161MaRDI QIDQ338219

Mike Mesterton-Gibbons, Tom N. Sherratt, Tugba Karabiyik

Publication date: 4 November 2016

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0152-4

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryevolutionarily stable strategyanimal contestsownershipterritorialityinfinite regressprivate propertybourgeoishawk-dove model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (2)

Chris Cannings: a life in games ⋮ Evolutionary games with sequential decisions and dollar auctions

Cites Work

• Neighbor intervention: a game-theoretic model
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• The Logic of Animal Conflict
• Nonlinear Programming
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