On the evolution of partial respect for ownership

DOI10.1007/S13235-015-0152-4MaRDI QIDQ338219zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mike Mesterton-Gibbons, Tugba Karabiyik, Tom N. Sherratt

Publication date 4 November 2016

Published in Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0152-4

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryevolutionarily stable strategyanimal contestsownershipterritorialityinfinite regressprivate propertybourgeoishawk-dove model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 53924 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2017728 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2171469 (Why is no real title available?)
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Game-theoretical models in biology
• Neighbor intervention: a game-theoretic model
• Nonlinear Programming
• The logic of animal conflict

Cited in

(3)

• Chris Cannings: a life in games
• Evolutionary games with sequential decisions and dollar auctions
• How residency duration affects the outcome of a territorial contest: complementary game-theoretic models

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