On the evolution of partial respect for ownership

DOI10.1007/S13235-015-0152-4zbMATH Open1348.91040OpenAlexW2046970161MaRDI QIDQ338219FDOQ338219

Authors: Mike Mesterton-Gibbons, Tugba Karabiyik, Tom N. Sherratt 

Publication date: 4 November 2016

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0152-4

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zbMATH Keywords

game theoryevolutionarily stable strategyanimal contestsownershipterritorialityinfinite regressprivate propertybourgeoishawk-dove model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
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• The logic of animal conflict
• Game-theoretical models in biology
• Nonlinear Programming
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• Neighbor intervention: a game-theoretic model

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• Chris Cannings: a life in games
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