Managerial Incentives and Corporate Fraud: The Sources of Incentives Matter*

DOI10.1093/ROF/RFN014zbMATH Open1169.91425OpenAlexW3125313247MaRDI QIDQ3395699FDOQ3395699

Authors: Shane A. Johnson, Harley E. Jun. Ryan, Yisong S. Tian 

Publication date: 13 September 2009

Published in: Review of Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfn014

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Statistical methods; economic indices and measures (91B82)

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• The fog of fraud -- mitigating fraud by strategic ambiguity
• Product market competition, incentives and fraudulent behavior
• Stock options and managers' incentives to cheat
• High-powered incentives and fraudulent behavior: stock-based versus stock option-based compensation

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