Managerial Incentives and Corporate Fraud: The Sources of Incentives Matter*

DOI10.1093/ROF/RFN014MaRDI QIDQ3395699zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Shane A. Johnson, Harley E. Jun. Ryan, Yisong S. Tian

Publication date 13 September 2009

Published in Review of Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfn014

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Statistical methods; economic indices and measures (91B82)

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• High-powered incentives and fraudulent behavior: stock-based versus stock option-based compensation

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