Analysis of the insecurity of ECMQV with partially known nonces

DOI10.1007/10958513_19zbMATH Open1255.94061DBLPconf/isw/LeadbitterS03OpenAlexW1493567254WikidataQ57485798 ScholiaQ57485798MaRDI QIDQ3404409FDOQ3404409

Authors: Peter J. Leadbitter, N. P. Smart 

Publication date: 9 February 2010

Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/10958513_19

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

Cited In (4)

• TMQV: A Strongly eCK-Secure Diffie-Hellman Protocol without Gap Assumption
• The insecurity of the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm with partially known nonces
• Another look at HMQV
• Lattice-based fault attacks against ECMQV

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