Monitoring and incentives in a supply chain: an agency-theoretic perspective
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Publication:3429063
DOI10.1080/02522667.2006.10699684zbMATH Open1179.90012OpenAlexW2144218265MaRDI QIDQ3429063FDOQ3429063
Authors: Juimin Hsiao, Changchun Tsai 
Publication date: 30 March 2007
Published in: Journal of Information and Optimization Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/02522667.2006.10699684
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Cites Work
- Decentralized multi-echelon supply chains: incentives and information
- Some two-echelon style-goods inventory models with asymmetric market information
- Co-op advertising models in manufacturer-retailer supply chains: A game theory approach
- Information sharing in a supply chain: a note on its value when demand is nonstationary
Cited In (5)
- Inter-organizational purchasing contracts: the effects of multi-agents in a supplying firm
- Incentive mechanism of hybrid offerings generation based on multi-task principle-agent model
- Motivation system of crowdsourcing community from a supply chain perspective
- Multiple principal-agent relationships model based on fairness preference
- The principal-agent problem in supply chain management -- the simulation based framework
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