Coordinating supply chain with revenue-sharing contract under asymmetric information
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Publication:3501434
zbMATH Open1150.90325MaRDI QIDQ3501434FDOQ3501434
Authors: Ruozhen Qiu, Xiaoyuan Huang
Publication date: 3 June 2008
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- Dynamic supply chain revenue sharing contract under mutable promotion efforts
- Supply chain coordination under asymmetric information and partial vertical integration
- Reputation compensation for incentive alignment in a supply chain with trade credit under information asymmetry
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- A principal-agent model in a supplier-led supply chain under asymmetric information
- Study on coordination of capacity reservation under asymmetric information
- Simple contracts to coordinate the capacity procurement model with asymmetric demand information
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- Revenue sharing contract with two-way penalties
- Non-cooperative joint replenishment under asymmetric information
- Optimal contracts in two-echelon supply chain under asymmetric information and nonlinear demand
- Research on a bargaining problem between a disadvantaged wholesaler and a supplier under asymmetric information
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- Approaches to designing the revenue sharing contract under asymmetric cost information
- A rewarding-punishing coordination mechanism based on trust in a divergent supply chain
- Coordination of elderly healthcare service supply chain with information asymmetry: designs of option contracts under different demand distribution statuses
- Asymmetric supply chain models implementable with a mechanism design
- An advanced buyback contract and information asymmetry
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- Emergency quantity discount contract for risk aversion of participants under bilateral asymmetric information
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- Contracting and Information Sharing Under Supply Chain Competition
- The antagonism and cohesion of the upstream supply chain under information asymmetry
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