Coordinating supply chain with revenue-sharing contract under asymmetric information
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Publication:3501434
zbMATH Open1150.90325MaRDI QIDQ3501434FDOQ3501434
Authors: Ruozhen Qiu, Xiaoyuan Huang 
Publication date: 3 June 2008
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- A rewarding-punishing coordination mechanism based on trust in a divergent supply chain
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- Contracting and Information Sharing Under Supply Chain Competition
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