Publication:3522446

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zbMath1152.81800arXivquant-ph/0301141MaRDI QIDQ3522446

Christof Zalka, John Proos

Publication date: 3 September 2008

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0301141


81P68: Quantum computation

94A60: Cryptography

14G50: Applications to coding theory and cryptography of arithmetic geometry

81P94: Quantum cryptography (quantum-theoretic aspects)


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