Higher-order masked Saber
DOI10.1007/978-3-031-14791-3_5zbMATH Open1518.94076OpenAlexW4294698993MaRDI QIDQ6134812FDOQ6134812
Authors: Suparna Kundu, Jan-Pieter D'Anvers, Michiel Van Beirendonck, Angshuman Karmakar, Ingrid Verbauwhede
Publication date: 25 July 2023
Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-14791-3_5
Recommendations
Data encryption (aspects in computer science) (68P25) Cryptography (94A60) Quantum cryptography (quantum-theoretic aspects) (81P94) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)
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Cited In (5)
- Efficiently masking polynomial inversion at arbitrary order
- A lightweight implementation of Saber resistant against side-channel attacks
- One-hot conversion: towards faster table-based A2B conversion
- Fast first-order masked NTTRU
- A message recovery attack on LWE/LWR-based PKE/KEMs using amplitude-modulated EM emanations
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