Formally Bounding the Side-Channel Leakage in Unknown-Message Attacks

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-88313-5_33MaRDI QIDQ3533964zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Michael Backes, Boris Köpf

Publication date 27 October 2008

Published in Computer Security - ESORICS 2008 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88313-5_33

zbMATH Keywords

cryptographic algorithmsmessage-blindingunknown-message side-channel attacks

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

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Cited in

(7)

• Adaptive chosen-message side-channel attacks
• LWE with side information: attacks and concrete security estimation
• Algebraic Side-Channel Attacks Beyond the Hamming Weight Leakage Model
• Asymptotic information leakage under one-try attacks
• Searching secrets rationally
• Quantitative mitigation of timing side channels
• Leakage resilient value comparison with application to message authentication

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