Models of state inspections organizations and struggle against corruptions

zbMATH Open1212.91081MaRDI QIDQ3579620FDOQ3579620

Authors: P. A. Kartunova, A. S. Urazov, Aleksandr A. Vasin 

Publication date: 9 August 2010

Full work available at URL: http://mathnet.ru/eng/mm/v22/i4/p67

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Cited In (7)

• Corruption suppression models: the role of inspectors' moral level
• Two-stage game-theoretic model of inspection and embezzlement in a three-level control system
• Models of optimal organization of the tax inspection
• Dynamic models for coordinating private and public interests in economic corruption
• Optimum parameters of hierarchical control structures
• Static models of struggle against corruption in hierarchical management systems
• Mean-field-game model of corruption

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