Models of optimal organization of the tax inspection

MaRDI QIDQ6646201FDOQ6646201

Authors: Aleksandr A. Vasin, Nikita I. Tsyganov 

Publication date: 29 November 2024

Published in: Matematicheskaya Teoriya Igr i eë Prilozheniya (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

hierarchical structuresgame-theoretic modelscorruption

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Optimal organization of an inspection structure
• Incentives and Loss of Control in an Optimal Hierarchy
• Mean-field-game model of corruption
• Dynamic models for coordinating private and public interests in economic corruption
• Many agent games in socio-economic systems: corruption, inspection, coalition building, network growth, security
• Title not available (Why is that?)

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