MODAL MODELS FOR BRADWARDINE'S THEORY OF TRUTH

DOI10.1017/S1755020308080180MaRDI QIDQ3580671zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Greg Restall

Publication date 13 August 2010

Published in The Review of Symbolic Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1017/s1755020308080180

zbMATH Keywords

paradoxestheory of truthliar

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) History of mathematical logic and foundations (03-03) History of mathematics in Late Antiquity and medieval Europe (01A35)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• An alternative semantics for quantified relevant logic
• Propositional quantifiers
• Semantics for quantified relevance logic
• Symmetry and Paradox
• The logic of paradox
• Truth and the liar in De Morgan-valued models
• What truth depends on

Cited in

(6)

• Paradox, closure and indirect speech reports
• Read on Bradwardine on the liar
• Bradwardine hypersequents
• Truth-tellers in Bradwardine's theory of truth
• Denotation, paradox and multiple meanings
• On the status of reflection and conservativity in replacement theories of truth

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