Environmental innovation, war of attrition and investment grants

DOI10.1142/S0219198910002507zbMATH Open1232.91551OpenAlexW3121200205MaRDI QIDQ3589652FDOQ3589652

Authors: Cesare Dosi, Michele Moretto 

Publication date: 20 September 2010

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198910002507

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zbMATH Keywords

network externalitiessecond-price auctioninvestment irreversibilityenvironmental innovationinvestment grants

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Cites Work

• A theory of the term structure of interest rates
• Martingales and arbitrage in multiperiod securities markets
• Real options and preemption under incomplete information
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A GAME MODEL OF IRREVERSIBLE INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY

Cited In (5)

• Setting the stakes in environmental contests
• On reducing the windfall profits in environmental subsidy programs
• Being green first: simultaneous vs. sequential abatement decisions
• When the weak win: the role of investment in environmental lobbying
• Induced effects and technological innovation with strategic environmental policy

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