On reducing the windfall profits in environmental subsidy programs
DOI10.1016/J.JEEM.2009.04.002zbMATH Open1194.91139OpenAlexW2170990027MaRDI QIDQ994083FDOQ994083
Authors: Carmen Arguedas, Daan P. van Soest 
Publication date: 17 September 2010
Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2009.04.002
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Cites Work
- A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
- Incentives for advanced pollution abatement technology at the industry level: An evaluation of policy alternatives
- Dynamic incentives of environmental regulations: The effects of alternative policy instruments on technology diffusion
- On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control
- Optimal environmental regulation of politically influential sectors with asymmetric information
Cited In (6)
- Government subsidies for green technology development under uncertainty
- Subsidy design in a vessel speed reduction incentive program under government policies
- A contingent claims analysis of optimal investment subsidy
- Environmental innovation, war of attrition and investment grants
- Why do governments use closed ended subsidies to support entrepreneurial investment?
- Optimal environmental regulation of politically influential sectors with asymmetric information
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