Abstracting and Verifying Strategy-Proofness for Auction Mechanisms

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-93920-7_13zbMATH Open1207.68096OpenAlexW1796295358MaRDI QIDQ3601792FDOQ3601792

Authors: Emmanuel Tadjouddine, Frank Guerin, Wamberto W. Vasconcelos 

Publication date: 12 February 2009

Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-93920-7_13

Recommendations

• Verifying Dominant Strategy Equilibria in Auctions
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• Computer-aided verification for mechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Specification and verification (program logics, model checking, etc.) (68Q60) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42) Internet topics (68M11)

Cites Work

• Computationally manageable combinational auctions
• Faster Scaling Algorithms for Network Problems
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Verifying Dominant Strategy Equilibria in Auctions
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Programming and Verifying Subgame-Perfect Mechanisms

Cited In (5)

• Verifying Dominant Strategy Equilibria in Auctions
• Bisimulations for verifying strategic abilities with an application to the ThreeBallot voting protocol
• A Qualitative Comparison of the Suitability of Four Theorem Provers for Basic Auction Theory
• An introduction to mechanized reasoning
• Strictly strategy-proof auctions

Uses Software

• SPIN
• AgentSpeak

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