Explanationist Aid for the Theory of Inductive Logic
DOI10.1093/BJPS/AXP008zbMATH Open1183.03005OpenAlexW2136943651MaRDI QIDQ3638864FDOQ3638864
Authors: Michael Huemer
Publication date: 28 October 2009
Published in: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axp008
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Probability and inductive logic (03B48) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)
Cited In (11)
- A frequentist interpretation of probability for model-based inductive inference
- On the pragmatic and epistemic virtues of inference to the best explanation
- Rational understanding: toward a probabilistic epistemology of acceptability
- Probability and inductive logic (to appear)
- THE INDUCTIVE REASONING IN STATISTICAL INFERENCE
- Inference to the best explanation, coherence and other explanatory virtues
- Explication of inductive probability
- The principle of indifference and inductive scepticism
- A geometric principle of indifference
- Can there be a Bayesian explanationism? On the prospects of a productive partnership
- A transcendental argument for induction
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