HPAKE : Password Authentication Secure against Cross-Site User Impersonation
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Publication:3648469
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-10433-6_19zbMATH Open1307.94117OpenAlexW1742155081MaRDI QIDQ3648469FDOQ3648469
Authors: Xavier Boyen 
Publication date: 26 November 2009
Published in: Cryptology and Network Security (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10433-6_19
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Data encryption (aspects in computer science) (68P25) Cryptography (94A60) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)
Cited In (6)
- On the (in)security of the Diffie-Hellman oblivious PRF with multiplicative blinding
- User-aware provably secure protocols for browser-based mutual authentication
- Smooth NIZK arguments
- SPP: An anti-phishing single password protocol
- Enforcing User-Aware Browser-Based Mutual Authentication with Strong Locked Same Origin Policy
- Provably Secure Scalable Distributed Authentication for Clouds
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