HPAKE : Password Authentication Secure against Cross-Site User Impersonation

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-10433-6_19MaRDI QIDQ3648469zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Xavier Boyen

Publication date 26 November 2009

Published in Cryptology and Network Security (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10433-6_19

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Data encryption (aspects in computer science) (68P25) Cryptography (94A60) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

Recommendations

• OPAQUE: an asymmetric PAKE protocol secure against pre-computation attacks
• Fuzzy asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange
• Two-Server Password-Only Authenticated Key Exchange
• Oblivious PAKE: efficient handling of password trials
• User-aware provably secure protocols for browser-based mutual authentication

Cited in

(7)

• Provably Secure Scalable Distributed Authentication for Clouds
• Smooth NIZK arguments
• tPAKE: typo-tolerant password-authenticated key exchange
• On the (in)security of the Diffie-Hellman oblivious PRF with multiplicative blinding
• SPP: An anti-phishing single password protocol
• User-aware provably secure protocols for browser-based mutual authentication
• Enforcing User-Aware Browser-Based Mutual Authentication with Strong Locked Same Origin Policy

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