User-aware provably secure protocols for browser-based mutual authentication

DOI10.1504/IJACT.2009.028028zbMATH Open1171.94347OpenAlexW2066606468MaRDI QIDQ843365FDOQ843365

Authors Sebastian Gajek, Mark Manulis, Jörg Schwenk 

Publication date 12 October 2009

Published in International Journal of Applied Cryptography (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1504/ijact.2009.028028

zbMATH Keywords

password authenticationmutual authenticationsecurity modelscookie authenticationhuman perceptible authenticationimpersonation attacksprovably secure protocolsuser awarenessweb browsersweb servers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

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Cited In (5)

• Title not available (Why is no real title available?)
• A Universally Composable Framework for the Analysis of Browser-Based Security Protocols
• Enforcing User-Aware Browser-Based Mutual Authentication with Strong Locked Same Origin Policy
• HPAKE : Password Authentication Secure against Cross-Site User Impersonation
• Applied Cryptography and Network Security

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