User-aware provably secure protocols for browser-based mutual authentication

DOI10.1504/IJACT.2009.028028zbMATH Open1171.94347OpenAlexW2066606468MaRDI QIDQ843365FDOQ843365

Authors: Sebastian Gajek, Mark Manulis, Jörg Schwenk 

Publication date: 12 October 2009

Published in: International Journal of Applied Cryptography (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1504/ijact.2009.028028

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zbMATH Keywords

password authenticationmutual authenticationsecurity modelscookie authenticationhuman perceptible authenticationimpersonation attacksprovably secure protocolsuser awarenessweb browsersweb servers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

Cited In (5)

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A Universally Composable Framework for the Analysis of Browser-Based Security Protocols
• Enforcing User-Aware Browser-Based Mutual Authentication with Strong Locked Same Origin Policy
• HPAKE : Password Authentication Secure against Cross-Site User Impersonation
• Applied Cryptography and Network Security

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