Quantity stickiness versus Stackelberg leadership

DOI10.1063/1.3030801MaRDI QIDQ3650641zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Fernanda A. Ferreira

Publication date 15 December 2009

Published in AIP Conference Proceedings (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1063/1.3030801

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryentryCournot modellicensing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Recommendations

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(4)

• Stackelberg leadership in a marketing channel
• Market instability in a Stackelberg duopoly
• Flexibility in a Stackelberg leadership with differentiated goods
• Stackelberg leadership with product differentiation and endogenous entry: some comparative static and limiting results

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