Quantity stickiness versus Stackelberg leadership

DOI10.1063/1.3030801zbMATH Open1178.91058OpenAlexW1767157811MaRDI QIDQ3650641FDOQ3650641

Authors: Fernanda A. Ferreira 

Publication date: 15 December 2009

Published in: AIP Conference Proceedings (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1063/1.3030801

Recommendations

• Endogenous Stackelberg leadership
• Stackelberg leadership with product differentiation and endogenous entry: some comparative static and limiting results
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• Flexibility in a Stackelberg leadership with differentiated goods

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryentryCournot modellicensing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Cited In (4)

• Market instability in a Stackelberg duopoly
• Flexibility in a Stackelberg leadership with differentiated goods
• Stackelberg leadership with product differentiation and endogenous entry: some comparative static and limiting results
• Stackelberg leadership in a marketing channel

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