On stationary equilibria of a single-controller stochastic game

DOI10.1007/BF02591936zbMath0568.93056MaRDI QIDQ3686594

Jerzy A. Filar

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Mathematical Programming (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

finite algorithms; extreme and pseudo-extreme equilibrium strategies; stationary equilibrium points; two-person noncooperative undiscounted stochastic games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A05: 2-person games

91A15: Stochastic games, stochastic differential games

91A60: Probabilistic games; gambling

Related Items

Quadratic programming and the single-controller stochastic game, Cyclic Markov equilibria in stochastic games, A finite step algorithm via a bimatrix game to a single controller non- zero sum stochastic game, Two-person zero-sum stochastic games

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