Conditional Probability
DOI10.2307/1402890zbMATH Open0594.62002OpenAlexW4245439404MaRDI QIDQ3725313FDOQ3725313
Authors: Glenn Shafer
Publication date: 1985
Published in: International Statistical Review / Revue Internationale de Statistique (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1402890
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law of large numbersconditional expectationsaxiomsconditional probabilitiesprotocolsubjective probabilitypossibilitiesbetting procedure
Foundations and philosophical topics in statistics (62A01) Axioms; other general questions in probability (60A05)
Cited In (29)
- A new understanding of subjective probability and its generalization to lower and upper prevision.
- Inductive learning and defeasible inference
- Sampling Bias and Logistic Models
- The probabilistic analysis of testimony
- What Are Conditional Probabilities Conditional Upon?
- Belief function and multivalued mapping robustness in statistical estimation
- Updating beliefs with incomplete observations
- Comment: ``On the history and limitations of probability updating
- Judicious judgment meets unsettling updating: dilation, sure loss and Simpson's paradox
- A mathematical theory of evidence turns 40
- A betting interpretation for probabilities and Dempster-Shafer degrees of belief
- Monty Hall saves Dr. Evil: on Elga's restricted principle of indifference
- Biased information and the exchange paradox
- Forward irrelevance
- Conditioning, updating and lower probability zero
- Conditionalization and not knowing that one knows
- Rejoinders to comments on Perspectives on the theory and practice of belief functions
- Editorial. Probability and statistics: foundations and history. Special issue in honor of Glenn Shafer
- Glenn Shafer -- a short biography
- The notion of event in probability and causality: situating myself relative to Bruno de Finetti
- Safe probability
- Stopping rules and the likelihood function
- The coherence argument against conditionalization
- Conglomerable natural extension
- Imprecise probability trees: bridging two theories of imprecise probability
- Some epistemological ramifications of the Borel-Kolmogorov paradox
- Single-case probabilities and the case of Monty Hall: Levy's view
- Credal networks under epistemic irrelevance
- Probability and time
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