A new understanding of subjective probability and its generalization to lower and upper prevision.
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1400220
DOI10.1016/S0888-613X(02)00134-2zbMath1092.68098MaRDI QIDQ1400220
Peter R. Gillett, Richard B. Scherl, Glenn R. Shafer
Publication date: 13 August 2003
Published in: International Journal of Approximate Reasoning (Search for Journal in Brave)
Reasoning under uncertainty in the context of artificial intelligence (68T37) Axioms; other general questions in probability (60A05) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)
Related Items
Uncertainty modelling and conditioning with convex imprecise previsions, Imprecise probability trees: bridging two theories of imprecise probability, Computing upper and lower bounds in interval decision trees, Credal networks under epistemic irrelevance, A probabilistic logic based on the acceptability of gambles, Desirability foundations of robust rational decision making, Conditioning, updating and lower probability zero, A logical characterization of coherence for imprecise probabilities, Probability and time, Forward irrelevance, Williams coherence and beyond, A betting interpretation for probabilities and Dempster-Shafer degrees of belief, A survey of the theory of coherent lower previsions, Conditional independence and chain event graphs, Ranking discrete outcome alternatives with partially quantified uncertainty, Causal interpretation of graphical models
Uses Software
Cites Work
- A probabilistic logic based on the acceptability of gambles
- Notes on conditional previsions
- Bayes's two arguments for the rule of conditioning
- The logic of events
- Towards a unified theory of imprecise probability
- Probability and Finance
- CHARACTERIZATION OF COHERENT CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES AS A TOOL FOR THEIR ASSESSMENT AND EXTENSION
- Present Position and Potential Developments: Some Personal Views: Statistical Theory: The Prequential Approach
- Conditional Probability
- Belief functions in business decisions
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item