A conditional logit model for executive incentives

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(83)90100-3zbMATH Open1273.91361OpenAlexW2011507820MaRDI QIDQ374875FDOQ374875

Authors: M. J. Courchane 

Publication date: 24 October 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(83)90100-3

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Statistical methods; economic indices and measures (91B82) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

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