Decentralizing Constrained Pareto Optimal Allocations in Stock Ownership Economies: An Impossibility Theorem

DOI10.2307/2526725MaRDI QIDQ3798433zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Robert Forsythe, Gerry L. Suchanek

Publication date 1987

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2526725

zbMATH Keywords

impossibility theoremcollective decision makinginformational imperfectionstock market allocations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Group preferences (91B10) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Recommendations

• Decisions and Optimality in Competitive Stock Ownership Economies
• Collective Decision Mechanisms and Efficient Stock Market Allocations: Existence of a Participation Equilibrium
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Cited in

(4)

• Collective Decision Mechanisms and Efficient Stock Market Allocations: Existence of a Participation Equilibrium
• A necessary condition for decentralization and an application to intertemporal allocation
• An impossibility theorem on capital allocation
• Decisions and Optimality in Competitive Stock Ownership Economies

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