Decentralizing Constrained Pareto Optimal Allocations in Stock Ownership Economies: An Impossibility Theorem
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Publication:3798433
DOI10.2307/2526725zbMATH Open0652.90009OpenAlexW2003820013MaRDI QIDQ3798433FDOQ3798433
Authors: Robert Forsythe, Gerry L. Suchanek
Publication date: 1987
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2526725
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Cited In (4)
- Decisions and Optimality in Competitive Stock Ownership Economies
- A necessary condition for decentralization and an application to intertemporal allocation
- Collective Decision Mechanisms and Efficient Stock Market Allocations: Existence of a Participation Equilibrium
- An impossibility theorem on capital allocation
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