scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4085361
[For the entire collection see Zbl 0658.00021.] This paper proposes to study a non-rational rule of behaviour, namely, pure adaptation. This rule consists of a direct revision of the decisions taken by the agent, i.e. a revision which is not based on a precise subjective representation of the agent's environment and preferences (as opposed to what happens in rational behaviour). Instead, the correction of the actions is then inspired by the observation of unsatisfactory elements of disequilibrium in the agent's situation, and is implemented by a rule of thumb designed to remove them by trial and error. The paper is organised as follows. After a prelimiary section where precise definitions of the notions of optimal decision and optimizing behaviour are given, section 3 develops the argument that the optimal (rational) decision can be viewed as the limit of a convergent purely adaptive process of ``tâtonnement. Section 4, considering the case of a monopoly, shows that in a context of incomplete information, a purely adaptive behaviour can be no less efficient than an optimizing behaviour with learning. All mathematical proofs of the propositions are relegated to the Appendix.
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