scientific article; zbMATH DE number 18692
[For the entire collection see Zbl 0731.00015.] The proportional bargaining set differs from the traditional bargaining set in the sense of Aumann-Maschler and Mas-Colell by the fact that objections and counter objections are defined to be proportional to the proposed allocation \(x\). Therefore, each coalition has in fact at most one objection or counter-objection. The author proves that the proportional bargaining set of NTU-games exists if the game satisfies two quite common conditions, Weak Superadditivity and Strong Comprehensiveness. In the proof he uses the coincidence theorem of Ky Fan. Further he gives an example showing that the traditional bargaining set and his proportional bargaining set cannot be compared by inclusion.
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- Proportionality in NTU games: on a proportional excess invariant solution
- Proportional solutions for bargaining games and NTU games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1999229 (Why is no real title available?)
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