Spatial Competition and the Core

DOI10.2307/2937934MaRDI QIDQ3976900zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors W. Bentley MacLeod, Jacques-François Thisse, Jonathan H. Hamilton

Publication date 25 June 1992

Published in The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/275212

zbMATH Keywords

coreequilibrium in pure strategiesHotelling's two-stage gameloation modelsmarket gameprice subgame

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Spatial models in sociology (91D25)

Recommendations

• Equilibrium in Hotelling's Model of Spatial Competition
• Efficient spatial competition
• A noncooperative analysis of Hotelling's location game
• On Hotelling's competition with non-uniform customer distributions
• Competitive Spatial Price Discrimination with Capacity Constraints

Cited in

(20)

• Location-allocation on a line with demand-dependent costs
• Ex-post price stability with convex costs
• On price competition in location-price models with spatially separated makets
• Spatial competition with an outside good and distributed reservation prices.
• Stationary and nonstationary strategies in Hotelling's model of spatial competition with repeated pricing decisions
• Competition in the traditional sector does not matter for the `core-periphery' model
• Spatial competition on 2-dimensional markets and networks when consumers don't always go to the closest firm
• Customization competition between branded firms: continuous extension of product line from core product
• Spatial competition between shopping centers
• Local market structure in a Hotelling town
• Externality in a Stackelberg spatial competition model
• ATM pricing and location games in the retail banking industry
• Secure strategy equilibrium in Hotelling's model of spatial competition
• Competition of Firms: Discriminatory Pricing and Location
• Noncooperative Bargaining and Spatial Competition
• Spatial Competition with a Land Market: Hotelling and Von Thunen Unified
• Competitive Spatial Price Discrimination with Capacity Constraints
• Hotelling competition with discrete consumers
• Efficient spatial competition
• A theoretical foundation for the undercut-proof equilibrium

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