A theoretical foundation for the undercut-proof equilibrium

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.06.001MaRDI QIDQ900417zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Martin C. Byford

Publication date 22 December 2015

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.06.001

zbMATH Keywords

network marketscore equivalenceBertrand-Nash equilibriumnon-transferable utility coalitional gamesundercut-proof equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Recommendations

• The concept of the undercut-proof equilibrium in multistage games
• Coalition-proof Bertrand equilibria
• Nonuniform Bertrand Competition
• Bertrand price competition with differentiated commodities
• A note on undominated Bertrand equilibria

Cites work

• Bargaining in a network of buyers and sellers.
• Efficient spatial competition
• Mixed pricing in oligopoly
• On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"
• Second best taxation as a game
• Solution of the Hotelling's game in secure strategies
• Spatial Competition and the Core

Cited in

(3)

• The concept of the undercut-proof equilibrium in multistage games
• Towards overcoming the undercutting problem
• Ex-post price stability with convex costs

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