Bargaining and the Right to Remain Silent

DOI10.2307/2951585MaRDI QIDQ4008532zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Lawrence M. Ausubel, Raymond Deneckere

Publication date 27 September 1992

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221215

zbMATH Keywords

alternating-offer bargaining gamesCoase conjecturenoncooperative bargainingone-sided incomplete informationsequential equilibriasilence theoremstationarity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(11)

• A note on repeated-offers bargaining with one-sided incomplete information
• Mediation: Incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication.
• The right to remain silent
• Optimal pricing strategy for durable-goods monopoly
• Strategic delay and endogeneous offers in bargaining games with private information
• Bargaining over a Menu of Wage Contracts
• Stationarity, Rationalizability and Bargaining
• Posted pricing vs. bargaining in sequential selling process
• The Effects of a Right to Silence
• Splitting the difference in incomplete-information bargaining: theory and widespread evidence from the field
• Monotonicity in ultimatum bargaining

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