Outsourcing versus technology transfer: Hotelling meets Stackelberg

DOI10.1007/S00712-012-0328-YzbMATH Open1294.91121OpenAlexW2126862063MaRDI QIDQ405017FDOQ405017

Andrea Pierce, Debapriya Sen

Publication date: 4 September 2014

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-012-0328-y

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zbMATH Keywords

outsourcingHotelling duopolyPareto improving contractsStackelberg leadership effecttechnology transfer

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Strategic production-distribution models: A critical review with emphasis on global supply chain models
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Capacity constraints may restore the existence of an equilibrium in the Hotelling model
• Explaining cross-supplies
• Communication and Inventory as Substitutes in Organizing Production
• Outsourcing versus technology transfer: Hotelling meets Stackelberg
• Location equilibrium with asymmetric firms: the role of licensing

Cited In (3)

• Outsourcing versus technology transfer: Hotelling meets Stackelberg
• Technology transfer with commitment.
• Technology licensing or cost‐reducing outsourcing? Game theoretical analysis on consumers' home bias effects and firms' optimal strategies

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