Information, Holdouts, and Land Assembly

DOI10.1006/JUEC.1995.1036MaRDI QIDQ4211642zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors William C. Strange

Publication date 7 October 1998

Published in Journal of Urban Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/juec.1995.1036

zbMATH Keywords

land assembly gamemultiple perfect Bayesian equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Spatial models in sociology (91D25) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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(7)

• Informational hold up and intermediaries
• Expropriation power in private dealings: quota rule in collective sales
• A model of seller holdout
• Holdups and holdouts: what do they have in common?
• An aspect of indivisible land development with a reservation level of revenue
• Combinatorial game equilibrium evaluation on compensation for land acquisition under bounded rationality
• On the land assembly problem

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