Tax Evasion, Concealment and the Optimal Linear Income Tax
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Publication:4213067
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Cited in
(21)- E-ZTAX: tax salience and tax rates
- Dynamic tax evasion with audits based on visible consumption
- Firm's tax evasion in a principal-agent model with self-protection
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- Are tax havens good? Implications of the crackdown on secrecy
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- Optimal taxation in the presence of black markets
- Optimal dynamic tax evasion
- Prospect theory and tax evasion: a reconsideration of the Yitzhaki puzzle
- A General Characterization of Optimal Income Tax Enforcement
- Higher taxes at the top? The role of tax avoidance
- Tax evasion: a two-period model
- Morality, tax evasion, and equity
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1795168 (Why is no real title available?)
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