Paying for Pollution: Permits and Charges

DOI10.2307/3440859MaRDI QIDQ4223374zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors R. Quentin Grafton, Rose Anne Devlin

Publication date 3 January 1999

Published in Scandinavian Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/3440859

zbMATH Keywords

tradeable emission permits

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Recommendations

• Monetary emissions trading mechanisms
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Cited in

(5)

• The effects of separability on incentive-based instrument performance
• Allocation of CO\(_2\) emissions permits: A general equilibrium analysis of policy instruments
• A trading-ratio system for trading water pollution discharge permits
• Transaction costs and tradeable permits
• Optimal allocation of tradable emission permits under upstream-downstream strategic interaction

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