European apportionment via the Cambridge compromise

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.10.003zbMath1237.91194arXiv1105.4294OpenAlexW2118375756MaRDI QIDQ423046

Geoffrey R. Grimmett

Publication date: 18 May 2012

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1105.4294

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (12)

Seat allocation in federal second chambers: logical models in Canada and Germany ⋮ Optimal seat allocation strategy for e‐sports gaming center ⋮ Fair apportionment in the view of the Venice Commission's recommendation ⋮ Evaluating competing criteria for allocating parliamentary seats ⋮ Mathematical aspects of degressive proportionality ⋮ A power-weighted variant of the EU27 Cambridge compromise ⋮ Computing the optimal weights in a utilitarian model of apportionment ⋮ On party-proportional representation under district distortions ⋮ A divisor apportionment method based on the Kolm-Atkinson social welfare function and generalized entropy ⋮ Asymptotic bias of some election methods ⋮ Apportionments with minimum Gini index of disproportionality: a quadratic knapsack approach ⋮ ON ALLOCATING SEATS TO PARTIES AND DISTRICTS: APPORTIONMENTS

Cites Work

• Asymptotic bias of some election methods
• Several methods for degressively proportional allotments. A case study

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