scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1269567
The Ramsey test, in its standard modern formulation, gives the following intuitive criterion for the rational acceptance of conditionals. A conditional proposition ``If \(A\), then \(B\) is (rationally) accepted in a given state of belief \(G\) just in case \(B\) should be accepted if \(G\) were revised by \(A\) as a new piece of information. Using the notations ``\(A> B\) for ``If \(A\), then \(B\), and ``\(G*A\) for ``\(G\) revised by \(A\), the Ramsey Test (RT) can be written as: \[ A>B\text{ is accepted in \(G\) iff \(B\) is accepted in }G*A. \tag{RT} \] The aim of the paper is to investigate the Gärdenfors Paradox (GP) in the context of (RT). The authors show that (GP) is based on a number of questionable assumptions and discuss three approaches to solve (GP): (1) (RT) is divided into two logically independent conditions: Strict (RT) and Monotonicity (to remind that (RT) implies Monotonicity!). The proposal was to replace (RT) by Strict (RT), while abandoning Monotonicity. (GP) is avoided since it essentially involves the assumption of monotonicity. (2) The second approach, namely Levi's non-propositional version, involved also modifying (RT) such that an epistemic conditional \(A>B\) is accepted in a belief state \(G\) iff \(B\in G*A\). Since conditionals cannot themselws be members of belief states, Monotonicity is not derivable and so (GP) is avoided. (3) Finally, the indexical approach is considered, according to which epistemic conditionals were thought of as expressing genuine beliefs, but only in a context-sensitive manner, relative to a belief state. The paper presents a semantics that validates both the full (RT) at the level of acceptance sets and Gärdenfors' axioms for belief revision, provided these axioms are applied to descriptive belief sets and not to acceptance sets. This avoids (GP). The three different approaches to solving (GP) are not competing to each other, and may be viewed as corresponding to different uses of conditional constructions in epistemic contexts. For the entire collection see [Zbl 0908.90003].
- The Ramsey test and conditional semantics
- DIFFERENCE-MAKING CONDITIONALS AND THE RELEVANT RAMSEY TEST
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1512634
- Ramsey's test, Adams' thesis, and left-nested conditionals
- Conditions on Ramsey nonequivalence
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1241668
- The Ramsey test revisited*
- A simple and non-trivial Ramsey test
- On the Ramsey test without triviality
- Belief ascription and the Ramsey test
- Variations on the Ramsey test: More triviality results
- Belief revision, epistemic conditionals and the Ramsey test
- Two notions of epistemic validity. Epistemic models for Ramsey's conditionals
- A sequent formulation of conditional logic based on belief change operations
- The suppositional Ramsey test and decision-instability
- The Ramsey test and evidential support theory
- Epistemic conditionals and the logic of subsets
- A reason maintenance perspective on relevant Ramsey conditionals
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1241668 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1512634 (Why is no real title available?)
- The Ramsey test revisited*
- Interpreting enthymematic arguments using belief revision
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 847983 (Why is no real title available?)
- DIFFERENCE-MAKING CONDITIONALS AND THE RELEVANT RAMSEY TEST
- AGM 25 years. Twenty-five years of research in belief change
- Reapproaching Ramsey: conditionals and iterated belief change in the spirit of AGM
- Characterization of AGM Belief Contraction in Terms of Conditionals
- New surprises for the Ramsey test
- A Kripke-Lewis semantics for belief update and belief revision
This page was built for publication:
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4236366)
