scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1301804
Truth in mathematics is a very appropriate theme for a conference on what mathematics is about. Questions of truth often work as a catalyst in bringing out contrasts between different positions concerning the nature of a given field. For instance, the question of the applicability of truth is a main issue in discussions on the position known as mathematical formalism, a position that occurs in many versions. Hilbert's variant of formalism is based on the idea that so-called real sentences are true or false while all other sentences lack truth values. In his chapter in this volume, \textit{H. G. Dales} [ibid., 181-200 (1998)] seems to advocate a more radical formalism. Challenging the realist conception of mathematics by saying that it takes truth as a key notion but leaves unanswered how truth is established, he takes the merit of formalism to be that it accounts for the nature of mathematics without relying upon any notion of truth. The critics of such a strict formalism typically claim that in the end even the formalist account will depend on some notion of truth. I think that such a criticism can be rightly levelled also against Dales's formalism. He proposes that a mathematical theorem is to be understood as asserting that a certain formula follows logically from certain axioms, but if follows logically is understood as follows according to the rules of predicate calculus, then the proposal reduces mathematics to a body of truths about a certain calculus, a certain formal game if you want. This makes mathematics a science that still pursues truths, although truths of a special kind, and we are left with explaining the nature of such truths. I am though in partial agreement with Dales's thinking that realism is unsatisfactory in not providing an informative explanation of its concept of truth. In this chapter I shall consider an alternative, constructive approach to truth. In other words, I shall discuss how truth is to be understood from the point of view of intuitionism or verificationism. I use the term verificationism to indicate that, following Michael Dummett, I am thinking of intuitionism as based on considerations of meaning approached from a verificationist point of view rather than on considerations of an ontological kind. The kind of verificationism that I have been interested in is inspired by some of Gentzen's work, which may not be known to everyone. Therefore, I shall first say something about the main idea of \textit{G. Gentzen}'s ``Untersuchungen über das logische Schließen [Math. Z. 39, 176-210, 405-431 (1934; Zbl 0010.14501 and Zbl 0010.14601)] that is relevant here. For the entire collection see [Zbl 0901.00023].
- On reduction rules, meaning-as-use, and proof-theoretic semantics
- Anti-realist truth and truth-recognition
- Truth from a proof-theoretic perspective
- Truth through proof. A formalist foundation for mathematics
- Objectivity and truth in mathematics: a sober non-Platonist perspective
- A new framework for justification logic
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7157611 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 972383 (Why is no real title available?)
- From the knowability paradox to the existence of proofs
- On Dummett's pragmatist justification procedure
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