scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1042120

Authors Yu S. Osipov, A. V. Kryazhimskij

Publication date 5 August 1997

Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Problems related to evolution (92D15)

Evolutionary games (processes of mass repetition of static games) were introduced as models of the evolution of biological communities. In recent years, the evolutionary-game models are given economic content. A number of works contain the analysis of general dynamical properties of evolutionary-game models appeared. This article is related to the latter trend. The purpose of the article is to indicate the global principle of the selection of ``optimal evolutionary games. Differential games are the means of selection. We proceed from the fact that the theory of differential games has a developed apparatus for separating a system of special equilibrium dynamics, controlled with conflict, from the set of admissible dynamics. In a certain sense, the former are the best ones for all participants of the control process. In this work, a differential game is constructed, in a natural way, on the class of evolutionary-game dynamics. The solution of a differential game leads to the isolation of the required equilibrium (``optimal) evolutionary games. For the entire collection see [Zbl 0863.00015].

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