Observability and incentive in organizations

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.09.025MaRDI QIDQ435795zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sanxi Li, Bing Ye, Jianyu Yu

Publication date 12 July 2012

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.09.025

zbMATH Keywords

investor-owned firmmoral hazard in teamobservabilityproducer-owned firm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

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Cited in

(1)

• Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts

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